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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

damages flowing from flooding caused by the rupture of a water main
which was being repaired by employees of Consolidated Edison. Although negligence was not proven, the trial judge allowed recovery,
against the City and Consolidated Edison, on the ground that substantial justice in these circumstances demanded application of the
strict liability rule.2 63 The appellate term reversed the judgment re264
garding Consolidated Edison.
Strict liability in tort is a question of substantive law. Hence,
the Appellate Term properly recognized that CCA 1804 bound the
court to precedent.2 6 5 The decision of the lower court in Bierman is
consistent with substantial justice, but the small-claims court is obliged
to administer "substantial justice ...

according to rules of substantive

law ... ." If substantial justice is not in accord with substantive law,
the former must yield.
GENERAL MuNIcIPAL LAW

GML 50-e: Section superseded by subsequent special enactment.
Conflict between a general law and a subsequently enacted special
law is resolved in favor of the special law.2 6 6 Illustrative of this principle
is Reinhart v. Troy Parking Authority,267 wherein the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirming the Supreme Court, Rensselaer
County, held that the time requirement of title 8 of the Public Authority
Law, a 1960 special enactment, superseded section 50-e of the General
Municipal Law. Plaintiff had filed his notice of claim with the proper
authority within six months from the accrual of his action but more
than ninety days thereafter.2 66 This constituted timely filing under the
controlling statute.
263 60 Misc. 2d at 499, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
The rule of substantive law says that Mrs. Bierman may not recover because
she cannot prove negligence on the part of the city or of Consolidated Edison.
Is this substantial justice? Only a very backward lawyer could think so.
Id. at 498, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
264 66 Misc. 2d at 238, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 333. It should be noted that the plaintiff still
received a judgment against a supposedly solvent party, i.e., New York City.
265 Courts of original jurisdiction do not make the law but follow it as developed
by the appellate court decisions, even though the controlling precedents conflict
with the views of the court of original jurisdiction, or are admittedly erroneous.
1 CARNIODY-WArr 2d § 2:58 (1965).
266 N.Y. CONsr. LAws §§ 397, 398 (McKinney 1971); Matter of Seligman v. Wickham,
33 App. Div. 2d 840, 305 N.Y.S.2d 951 (3d Dep't) (mem.) afikd, 27 N.Y.2d 993, 267 N.E.2d 482,
318 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1970) (mem.); East End Trust Co. v. Otten, 255 N.Y. 283, 174 N.E.2d
655 (1931).
267 36 App. Div. 2d 654, 818 N.Y.S.2d 852 (3d Dep't 1971) (mem.).
268 Id. at 654, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 853.

